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ABSTRACT 
 
Children switched at birth present not only emotional trauma but also a legal battle for 
all parties concerned. Thus the story of M and Z (an African boy and girl) switched at 
birth in OR Tambo Hospital on August 2, 2010 elucidates this challenge aptly. This 
challenge plays itself within the contested legal systems being the Common law system 
(Western Law) and African customary law, which bears different consequences for the 
same event of children being switched at birth. Therefore, the research interrogates the 
rules of African family law, particularly those related to children and their parenthood. 
Equally important is African laws approach to the legal status of the parents’ vis-à-vis 
the children switched at birth, as well as the compatibility of this approach with the 
Constitution and the Children’s Act. An analysis of similar cases of children switched at 
birth suggests that family mediation, a practice mandatory amongst African societies, 
must be used in such matters rather than lengthy court battles. Consequently, the 
benefits of family mediation and parenting co-ordination are discussed emphasizing the 
use of parenting agreements in resolving conflicts in matters relating to children 
switched at birth. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Background  
 
“It is not a matter where anyone can say they have won. It is a matter which must, at the 
end of the day, benefit the children.”2 
Switched at birth is an American movie directed by Waris Hussein.3 It is based on the 
true story of Kimberley Mays and Arlena Twigg who were switched shortly after their 
birth in Florida.4 Whilst one would hope that this story would remain fictional, it recently 
became a reality in South Africa in August 2010.5  
M and Z (an African boy and a girl) respectively were born in OR Tambo hospital.6 As a 
result of staff negligence they were switched at birth and the error was discovered 
eighteen months after the incident when the mother of M (hereinafter referred to as NN) 
approached the maintenance court in respect of her child.7 During this time a paternity 
test was performed on M and his alleged father LZ. It was discovered that not only was 
LZ not the biological father of M but MZ too was not his mother. NN then sought further 
information from OR Tambo Hospital and an investigation which confirmed that her child 
was switched at birth was undertaken. She, in fact, was mother to the girl (hereinafter 
referred to as Z) who was living with NS. NS was also under the false impression that 
                                               
2 ‘Babies switched at birth will not be returned to their biological family’ Independent Online 17 November 
2015, available at https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/babies-
switched-at-birth-will-not-be-returned-to-their-biological-family-a6738261.html, accessed on 15 November 
2016. 
3 ‘Switched at birth’ IMDb Online 28 April 1991, available at https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0103017/, 
accessed on 12 February 2018. 
4 ‘Seen but not heard: The revelatory silence of switched at birth,’ The New Yorker Online 24 September 
2012, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/24/seen-but-not-heard, accessed on 6 
June 2017. 
5 Unreported case of Centre for Child Law (Applicant) and Respondents respectively NN, NS, Presiding 
Officer of the Children’s Court in the District of Boksburg, MEC of Health in Gauteng, OR Tambo 
Memorial Hospital Chief Executive Officer and LZ (NPD) case number 32043/2014 of 17 November 2015. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Unreported case of Centre for Child Law (Applicant) and Respondents respectively NN, NS, Presiding 
Officer of the Children’s Court in the District of Boksburg, MEC of Health in Gauteng, OR Tambo 
Memorial Hospital Chief Executive Officer and LZ (NPD) case number 32043/2014 of 17 November 2015. 
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she was raising her own biological child. In 2014, NN approached the court to have her 
biological child returned to her.8  
Arguably, a baby switch causes not only emotional trauma but also results usually in a 
legal battle for all the parties concerned. The primary purpose of this study is to 
determine the rules of African family law, particularly those related to children and 
parenthood.9 Equally important is the African law approach to the legal status of the 
parent’s vis-à-vis the children switched at birth as well as the compatibility of this 
approach with the Constitution and the Children’s Act. This process of evaluating how 
the system of African law can be used “aimed to harness interest in this neglected area 
of law.”10 Lastly, this study purposefully argues that family mediation which is a practice 
mandatory amongst African or indigenous societies, should be used in these matters 
rather than lengthy court battles. Consequently, the benefits of family mediation and 
parenting co-ordination are discussed in Chapter four emphasises the use of parenting 
agreements in resolving conflicts in matters relating to children switched at birth.11 
The aim of this study therefore is to provide insight into the experience of parents and 
children alike who have been switched at birth. Parents, scholars and professional 
practitioners will thus gain knowledge of the areas of conflict that might arise as a result 
of one of the parents wishing to regain care over their biological child. The study 
canvasses the need for biological parents to play a meaningful role in the upbringing of 
their biological children.  Thus, this study further examines the factors used by the 
courts to determine who the rights and responsibilities are to be awarded to in respect 
of each child and whether African family law plays any significant role in reaching this 
decision. This study advocates (insofar as African children are involved) returning the 
switched children to their biological parents or blood relatives. This must be done in 
such a manner that the parties affected by a baby switch acknowledge each other as 
                                               
8 OR Tambo (note 7 above). 
9 South Africa has an essentially dualist system of law and Roman Dutch law will not be discussed herein. 
10 N Ntlama, ‘The slippery slope of customary law in South Africa’s new dispensation,’ College of Law and 
Management Studies eNewsletter, Vol 9(1), March 2016. 
11 J Foot, ‘What’s best for babies switched at birth? The role of the court, rights of non-biological parents 
and mandatory mediation of the custodial agreements,’ (1999) Whittier Law Review at 315-337.  
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part of the extended family and share parental responsibilities and rights through 
parental co-ordination and parental agreements.12  
1.1 Literature Review 
 
In all matters involving children, the best interests of the child are paramount.13 This is 
the legal position of children in South Africa. The move away from parental authority to 
a more child-centered approach of parental rights and responsibilities as seen in the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Children’s Act) is evidence of 
such. According to section 18(2) of the Children’s Act, parental rights and 
responsibilities are made up of four elements, namely: 
(a) To care for the child. 
(b) To maintain contact with the child. 
(c) To act as guardian for the child. 
(d) To contribute to the maintenance of the child. 
 
These rights and responsibilities are acquired automatically primarily through biology. 
Natural mothers acquire full parental rights and responsibilities by virtue of giving birth 
as conferred by section 19 of the Children’s Act.14 The automatic acquisition of rights to 
fathers is, however, more complex. A married father automatically acquires full parental 
rights and responsibilities on the birth of the child if he is married to the child’s mother or 
was married to her at any time between the conception and birth or after the child’s 
                                               
12 Ibid 317. 
13 Section 7 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
14 The Children’s Act, section 19: Parental responsibilities and rights of mothers 
1) The biological mother of the child, whether married or unmarried, has full parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the child. 
2) If;  
a) The biological mother is an unmarried child who does not have guardianship in respect of 
the child; and 
b) The biological father of the child does not have guardianship in respect of the child, 
The guardian of the child’s biological mother is also the guardian of the child. 
3) This section does not apply in respect of a child who is the subject of a surrogacy agreement.  
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birth. An unmarried biological father acquires full parental rights by fulfilling the 
conditions set out in section 21 of the Children’s Act.15  
The position is significantly different for children switched at birth. Though each of the 
parents may have parental rights and responsibilities over their own biological children, 
what then of the child that is currently in their care? Do they have any right to that child? 
If so, on what grounds are these rights based on? An order from the High Court, as the 
upper guardian of children, is needed to regulate the legal responsibilities and rights 
between the parents and children in this matter. This order shall give clarity on who has 
rights to each child and what those rights may entail. Changes to legislation may also 
be considered as an option to solve this legal dilemma of children switched at birth. 
However, this will not be canvassed in this study as it is limited to the expeditious 
resolution of the OR Tambo case dealt with by the court in this instance.  
 
1.1.1 African Law  
 
The discussion brings African customary law to the fore.  The definition of African 
customary law is contained in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Customary Marriages Act”). 16 In this Act “customary law” 
is defined as “the customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous 
                                               
15 The Children’s Act section 21: Parental responsibilities and rights of unmarried fathers 
1) The biological father of a child who does not have parental responsibilities and rights in respect of 
the child in terms of section 20, acquires full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the 
child- 
a) If at the time of the child’s birth he is living with the mother in a permanent life partnership; or 
b) If he, regardless of whether he has lived or is living with the mother- 
i) Consents to being identified or successfully applies in terms of section 26 to be identified 
as the child’s father in terms of customary law; 
ii) Contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute to the child’s upbringing for a 
reasonable period; and 
iii) Contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute towards expenses in connection 
with the maintenance of the child for a reasonable period.  
16 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. A similar definition is contained in section 1 of 
the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 9 of 2009. For 
criticisms against this definition see JC Bekker & C Rautenbach ‘Nature and sphere of African customary 
law.’(eds) (2014) 18-24. 
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African peoples of South Africa and which form the culture of those peoples.”17 Prior to 
the existence of this Act various descriptions of African law were provided by 
anthropologists and legal scholars. Matthews argues that the expression “customary 
law is generally used in two senses.”18 The first is in relation to an indigenous system of 
law existing amongst various African communities and the second to legislation that 
applies to Africans as a special grouping.19  
 
Bekker defines customary law as an “established system of immemorial rules which 
evolve from the way of life and natural wants of the people.”20 He distinguishes living 
customary law as a “non-specialized system of law that governs the conduct of the 
community and that is binding upon the members of the traditional community in which 
it is found.”21 Perhaps the most accurate definition of African law emanates from 
Hamnett who defines African law as a “set of norms to which actors in a social situation 
abstract from practice and which they invest with binding authority.”22 He correctly 
reasons that African law is not ascertained by asking what judges and lawyers say is 
law but rather what the participants in the dispute regard the rights and duties that apply 
to them are.23 From the above interpretations of what African law is, it is clear that the 
common thread amongst all these descriptions is that African law is a set of social rules 
agreed to by all the participants which will govern their conduct in the present and also 
possibly in the future.   
 
                                               
17 Section 1, Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
18 CWT Rammutla, The Official Version of Customary Law vis-à-vis the Living Hananwa Family Law 
(unpublished LLD thesis, UNISA, 2013) 10. 
19 Ibid see also Z Matthews, Bantu Law and Western Civilisation in South Africa: A study in the clash of 
cultures (unpublished LLM thesis, Yale University, 1934) 19-20. 
20 JC Bekker, Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa 5ed (1989) 11. 
21 Ibid 26. 
22 I Hamnett, Chieftainship and Legitimacy: an anthropological study of executive law in Lesotho (1975) at 
14. 
23 T P Moyo, The Relevance of Culture and Religion to the Understanding of Children’s Rights in South 
Africa (LLM thesis, UCT, 2007) 36.  
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Chanock argues that the concept “customary”, as commonly used to describe African 
law, has always been a source of confusion.24 He conceives of the term’s usage as one 
based on the distinction between law made by the state and immemorial practices. He 
notes that what made customary law valid was its long standing historical sameness. 
Put differently, that what was regarded customary was subject to constant change and 
adaptation and any newly asserted custom was regarded as the one that was “invented 
tradition.” Thus, the friction caused in what is now referred to as the official customary 
law versus living customary law debate began.  
 
The bone of contention lies within the fact that customs and ultimately, customary law, 
are invented as a response to circumstances. Consequently, if its validity is contingent 
on its long-standing sameness, a custom would be regarded invalid if it were later 
adapted to suit the changing needs of the community. It is for this reason that the 
concept “African law” is preferred for the purposes of this study. African law herein 
refers to indigenous law existing amongst the various African communities. It is law that 
is generated by and developed by the society in which it is found. Furthermore, African 
law is not static as it adapts to the evolving African values and culture. Here, Anyebe’s 
definition finds favour, as he acutely describes it as “an expression of the ideals and 
aspirations of a given people.”25 
 
Contrary to Myburgh’s submission, African law does not fall solely within the jurisdiction 
of anthropologists.26 One, however, cannot fault this sentiment because it is a telling 
mark of African laws subordinate status in the history of South African jurisprudence.27 
                                               
24 T Chanock, ‘Law, State and Culture: thinking about customary law after apartheid’ (unpublished paper 
presented at the Conference of the Association of Australia and the Pacific Annual Meeting Deakin 
University 30 November – 3 December 1990 at 56. 
25 A.P Anyebe, Customary Law: The War Without Arms (1985) 7-8. Channock also argues that the 
knowledge of customary law has been corralled off from legal knowledge and was an area that 
anthropologists rather than lawyers often claimed expertise. For more discussion on this see R Gordon 
‘The white man’s burden: ersatz customary law and internal pacification in South Africa’ (1989) 2 Journal 
of Historical Sociology 41. 
26 G J Van Niekerk, The interaction of Indigenous law and Western law in South Africa: A historical and 
comparative perspective (LLD thesis, UNISA, 1995) 13. 
27 Hamnett (note 22 above) 16. 
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Below is a short history of African law in South African jurisprudence, its recognition as 
a system of law and finally its application by the judiciary.   
 
1.1.2 Recognition of African Law: Official v Living 
 
The introduction of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Black Administration Act, alternatively, the BAA) was significant in South African 
law. The purpose of this Act was to regulate the administration of all judicial and 
substantive matters concerning African individuals. It was not, however, a cause for 
celebration amongst the African South Africans. This is because it was through this Act 
that African private law was accommodated as a separate recognised system of law 
applicable to Africans as long as it was not deemed to be in conflict with the European 
sense of morality or justice.28 The Act’s deceptive nature was evident since its inception 
as it became apparent that it was a weapon intended to perpetuate the discrimination 
against the majority of the population by entrenching a uniform system of indirect rule.29 
This was achieved by using state appointed traditional leaders who, as agents of the 
state, furthered the states agenda over those they were appointed to rule.30  
 
Meierhenrich describes the law of this time as that which was characterised by its ability 
to serve as an effective method of control – promising the betterment of the apartheid 
governments standing in the internal community by providing it with a modicum of 
legitimacy and sincere belief of appropriateness.31 Based on Meierhenhich’s reasoning 
it is submitted that perhaps the most objectionable effect of the BAA was its subsequent 
                                               
28 Section 31 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
29 N Ntlama, ‘The Application of section 8(3) of the Constitution in the Development of Customary Law 
Values in South Africa’s New Dispensation’ PER/PELJ 2012 (15) 1 at 24. 
30 V Ehrenreich- Risner, The effect of apartheid’s tribal authorities on chieftaincy and the Zulu people: 
separate development in Mtunzini District 1950-1970 (paper presented at a History and African Studies 
Seminar at the University of KwaZulu Natal 27 February 2013). 
31 Meirhenrich, Legacies of Law: Long –run Consequences of Legal Development in South Africa (2008) 
605-608. See also Dlamini at 1992 Legal Studies Forum 133 who demonstrates how the recognition of 
customary law was not born of any great concern towards the administration of justice amongst the 
African population but rather as a need to facilitate more effective means of asserting power over the 
population. 
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manipulation of African traditional authority as seen by withholding sovereignty from 
tribal authorities and vesting it in the local Bantu Commissioner. The office which made 
the final decision on all areas of law pertaining African people was that of the Governor-
General.32 Traditional leaders who would not accept this structure where assassinated 
and replaced with acquiescent appointed amakhosi.33 The result of this compromised 
the integrity of African law and ultimately led to the distrust of African law by those who 
were subjected to it.34  
 
The democratic dispensation brought with it new hope when many of the provisions of 
the BAA were declared unconstitutional upon the introduction of the Interim 
Constitution.35 It was during this time that a constitutionally elected assembly drew up 
the final Constitution which provided for the right to culture, which, in Professor 
Bennett’s opinion forms the foundation of the recognition and application of African 
law.36 The preamble of the Constitution acknowledges that there were divisions of the 
past, borne from the apartheid regime, which must be healed. It orders the Constitution 
to heal those divisions and lay the foundations for an open and democratic society. 
Sibanda, in “When is the Past not the Past?” highlights three factors which contributed 
to the recognition of African law in the final Constitution and they are noted as follows: 
 
“(a) Its incorporation into the nations system of law satisfied the need to incorporate a legal 
system rooted in African traditions and customs;  
(b)The African population which constituted the majority of the South African population, 
identified and conducted their lives in accordance with African law, further that;  
(c) An African legal system that could be part of the states’ administration was already in 
existence.”37 
 
                                               
32 I M Rautenbach, Constitutional Law 6th ed (2013) 103.  
33 Ibid 30 at 2. 
34 Chanock (note 24 above) 59. 
35 Interim Constitution Act 2000 of 1993.  
36 TW Bennet, Sourcebook of African Customary Law, (1991) 365. 
37 S Sibanda, ‘When is the past not the past? Reflections on customary law under South Africa’s 
constitutional dispensation’ Human Rights Brief (2010) 17(3). 
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Due to African law’s connection to the culture of the people whose conduct it seeks to 
govern, it is subject to constant change.38 Rammutla correctly states that because of the 
“causal link between the changing circumstances of the community and African law 
itself, in order to understand the phenomenon of living African law one must study the 
effects of the changing circumstances of society on the rule of African law.”39 Whilst this 
continual invention as characterised in African law must be viewed positively (as it is 
indicative of genuine responses to needs felt), it is important to note that it also creates 
difficulty for those seeking to rely on a rule of African law. This is because they bear the 
onus of proving its existence for the purpose of enforceability. It is with this complexity in 
mind that the subject of the judicial application of African law is explored. 
 
1.1.3 The Judicial Application of African Law 
 
In 1988, section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 44 of 1988 authorised all 
courts to take judicial notice of African law.40 Under this section African law could be 
applied in any court insofar as it could be ascertained readily and with sufficient 
certainty. Chanock explains that the subsequent advent of the BAA was the first part of 
liberalism. It promised, he elaborates, white superiority which acknowledged the 
possibility of many blacks being admitted into the upper echelon of the civilized.41 As 
briefly highlighted above, the BAA was less than generous in its administration of justice 
amongst the black majority because it gave the state the power to make laws in all 
aspects regulating African people. This limited the court’s ability to intervene in the 
affairs of African individuals thus limiting their access to justice.42 It was only the advent 
                                               
38 Ibid 2. 
39 Rammutla (note 18 above) 15. 
40 South Africa’s legal system can be described as dualistic as it has two distinct legal systems. One is 
based on Western tradition (which is a combination of Roman-Dutch law and English law) and the other is 
based on African traditions).  
41 Chanock (note 24 above) 61. 
42 ‘Black Native Administrative Act’ available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/black-native-
administration-act-1927-comes-effect-act-effect-gave-state-power-make-laws accessed on 15 December 
2017. 
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of democracy and liberation of the black majority which brought about new terms in 
which the law should apply.  
 
The Constitution as evident in its preamble concretises its status as the supreme law of 
the land. It states, amongst other things, that it intends to heal the divisions of the past 
and establish “a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights.”43 Section 211(3), read together with sections 30, 31 and 39(2) of the final 
Constitution recognises African law as a primary source of law in South Africa sharing 
equal status with the common law. It provides that the court must apply African law 
when it is applicable subject to the Constitution and any legislation specifically dealing 
with it.44 These provisions, with subsequent illuminating remarks from Constitutional 
Court bench are evidence of the Constitutions’ commitment to cultural diversity. Sachs J 
in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education noted that: 
 
“The presence of section 31 of the Bill of Rights may be understood as a product 
of the two-stage negotiation process resulting in the adoption of the final 
Constitution, in which one of the concerns was how the community rights could be 
protected in a non-racial parliamentary democracy based on universal suffrage, 
majority rule and individual rights. Constitutional Principle (CP) XI declared that the 
diversity of language and culture should be acknowledged and protected and 
conditions for their promotion encouraged.”45 
 
One cannot speak of the judicial application of African law without mentioning the most 
controversial case to this end - the case of Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, 
and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and 
Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another (hereinafter referred to as the Bhe case). The 
court in this case held that section 23 of the BAA and its regulations regarding male 
                                               
43 Ntlama (note 29 above) 15.  
44 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
45 2000(10) BCLR 1051 at para 24. See also Ntlama (note 25 above) 20. 
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primogeniture as it applied in African law was unconstitutional.46 The basis of the court’s 
reasoning was that the rule of male primogeniture discriminated unfairly against women 
and children born out of wedlock.47 The court in this regard considered the idea of 
developing new rules of African law in order to harmonise it with the Constitution and 
suggested that in the interim, a temporary regime was to be adopted to regulate 
intestate estates of African persons until the legislature was able to provide a more 
amicable solution. 
 
The “solution” as provided for by the legislature was the Reform of Customary Law of 
Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 (hereinafter referred to as 
RSCA). The RSCA read together with the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 provides 
that the surviving spouse and all the deceased’s children are all entitled to inherit from 
the deceased’s estate. This position is substantially different from the concept of who 
may inherit in terms of the African family structure. Sibanda argues that these statutes 
have gone a long way from reforming African law to now closely resembling their 
common law counterpart. He further adds that there is now little procedural difference 
between common law and African law when it comes to succession.48 Ntlama, in her 
analysis of the Constitutional Court judgment of Shilubana v Nwamitwa, correctly points 
out that though the Court “appears to have developed the customary law of succession 
of women to traditional leadership roles by enforcing the right to gender equality; it did 
so without considering the implications this would have on the identity of the particular 
indigenous society.”49 Whilst women empowerment is encouraged, it is, in fact, to be 
celebrated. It is presumptuous to assume that African law would not have arrived at the 
same conclusion had the concept of women empowerment not been allowed to develop 
                                               
46 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC). Sibanda, ‘When is the past not the past? Reflections on customary law under 
South Africa’s constitutional dispensation’ Human Rights Brief (2010) 17(3) at 5, correctly points out the 
core challenge facing the development of African customary law in both its legislation and application in 
the judiciary. He notes that it is not the idea of its reform that is questionable but rather the legislatures 
alternatively the Courts tendency to substitute common law rules to resolve a dispute geminating from 
customary law and terming this substitution a reform of customary law. 
47 The customary law rule of primogeniture dictates that the eldest male descendant stood to inherit the 
estate of their deceased male relative to the exclusion of all females including the wife. 
48 Sibanda, (note 37 above) 5.  
49 N Ntlama, ‘An Analysis of the Constitutional Court judgment of Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 9 BCLR 
914 (CC)’, (2009) Stell LR 333-356 11. 
12 
 
organically. This alone denotes the obscurity of a noble idea being rejected because it is 
too far removed from the reality that which currently persists in African law. 
 
The court in S v Acheson described the South Africa’s legal system as “a mirror 
reflecting the natural soul, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation, the 
articulation of the values bonding its people and disciplining its government.”50 It is 
contended that whilst this may be true on paper, South Africa’s essentially dualist legal 
system has remained unequal throughout the constitutional era. In legislation this is 
evident from the repugnancy provision and the consequences of mutual exclusivity of 
civil and African marriages. It remains that whilst African law is now formally recognised 
as a system of law equal to that of the common law, the reality, as pointed out by 
Sibanda is that “African customary law was and is still subordinated to the position of a 
tolerated but unloved stepchild.” The remnant of this lowly position is seconded by 
Ntlama who points out that “the application of the Bill of Rights as entrenched in section 
8(3) of the Constitution limits the development of the values of the new constitutional 
dispensation to common law”.51 Ntlama regards the notable exclusion of African law in 
this provision as a reminder of its former status of being regarded as nothing more than 
the poor cousin of common law.52 Whilst the development and empowerment of women 
cannot be faulted, it remains presumptuous to assume that African law would not have 
developed to this extent on its own. This stance by the court, whilst not being altogether 
incorrect, creates the unnecessary likelihood of the development being rejected 
because it is unfamiliar in the lives of those it seeks to govern. It is evident that no 
opportunity was granted to African law to develop its own mechanism to solve a newly 
exposed deficit in its own law.  
 
                                               
50 1991 2 SA 805. 
51 Ntlama (note 29 above) 32. 
52 T Nhlapo, in ‘Judicial function of traditional leaders: A contribution to restorative justice?’ (Unpublished 
paper presented at the conference of Association of Law Reform Agencies of Eastern and Southern 
Africa Vineyard Hotel Cape Town 14-17 March 2005) likens the unequal relationship between common 
law and African customary law with that of an older brother (in reference to the former) and the poor 
cousin (describing the latter). 
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This continued subordinate position is perpetuated by the judiciary’s tendency to use 
common law rules to resolve African law disputes. Ntlama submits that the court’s 
failure to ascertain the “genuine rules of customary law” as they are practiced in the 
community in which they are alleged to exist and to apply them to resolve African 
disputes has contributed to the “marginalisation and neglect of customary law as a legal 
science.”53 It is agreed that a rule cannot, in the absence of a thorough investigation 
confirming its practice and the context in which it exists, be declared inconsistent with 
the Constitution. The establishment of the authenticity of a rule thus precedes the test of 
constitutionality. Lesetedi JA, in the Botswana case of Ramantele also recognised and 
acknowledged that given the adaptability of African law to changing circumstances, it 
would prove difficult to “ascertain a firm and inflexible rule of African law for the purpose 
of deciding upon its constitutionality or enforceability”.54 It is clear that those wishing to 
rely upon an African law rule must first prove that the rule does in fact exist. 
Furthermore, it must be established that the rule is not repugnant to the Constitution or 
any legislation specifically dealing with African law.55 Where the rule is found lacking in 
this regard, it should be developed or struck down to the extent of its inconsistency with 
the Constitution. 
 
The court’s use of common law rules to resolve African law disputes is a failure by the 
bench to acknowledge and thus give due respect to the liberation struggle for which 
many fought and died to bring Africans (and ultimately their law) into recognition. This 
includes, but is not limited to, respecting the identity, values and laws of Bantu 
ethnicities.56 The judiciary’s uncommitted attitude to ascertaining the “living African law” 
as it applies in its respective indigenous societies, in favour of the “official law” 
                                               
53 Ntlama (note 10 above). 
54 Ramantele v Mmusi and Others (CACEB- 104- 12) 2013 BWCA (3 September 2013). See also C 
Rautenbach, ‘A family home, five sisters and the rule of ultimogeniture: Comparing notes on judicial 
approaches to customary law in South Africa and Botswana. ‘African Human Rights Law Journal, Vol 
16n1.Pretoria 2016. 
55 The court in Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) at para 54 laid down evidentiary rules for 
proving customary law. These rules include the calling of individuals living under customary law, advisors 
of traditional leaders and customary law experts.   
56 The Preamble declares that the Constitution is intended to honour those who suffered for justice and 
freedom in the land and give respect to those who have worked to build and develop the country by 
acknowledging all those who live in it, united in diversity. 
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developed during apartheid has divorced African law from its subjects and has put 
African law’s survival at risk. The added harm to this growing problem is the court’s 
tendency to term the substitution of African law with common law as a reform of African 
law.57 This indirect discrimination of African law has not only threatened the 
development of African law but has alienated a source of law which can “amass a 
wealth of experience and resource in judicial reasoning.”58 
 
In the light of the constitutional court’s recent decisions relating to African law, one 
wonders why, if it is that African law is so highly regarded, that its contribution to the 
general framework of the law is met with such resistance. This resistance, Ntlama 
reasons, begs the question of whether the Constitution has recognised “customary law 
out of genuine respect for indigenous cultures” or whether such recognition was merely 
intended to placate the African nation into believing that the constitutional dispensation 
has transformed the constitutional court in the resolution of African law disputes.59 
Ntlama correctly concludes that the Constitution, as the supreme law of the Republic, is 
tasked with the protection of African law rules.60 Sachs J endorses this view in Christian 
Education by arguing that: 
 
“CP X11 stated that collective rights of self-determination, in forming, joining and 
maintaining organs of civil society, including linguistic, cultural and religious 
associations should be recognised and protected…(they) go on to emphasize the 
protection to be given to the members of communities united by a shared 
language, culture or religion.”61  
 
Sibanda proposes that the most suitable way of remedying the injustice done to African, 
law is to engage it on its own terms rather than replacing it with laws that are culturally 
disconnected from those who are subject to it.62 This position finds favour with Ntlama 
                                               
57 Sibanda (note 37 above) 6. 
58 Ntlama (note 10 above).  
59 Ntlama (note 29 above) 26.  
60 Ntlama (note 29 above) 27. 
61 Christian Education (note 45 above) at paras 22 and 23.  
62 Sibanda (note 37 above) 5. 
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who adds that the “values of customary law need to be recognised and developed 
within their context in the framework of the new constitutional dispensation.”63 Chanock 
also endorses this view and argues that closing off avenues for the development and 
expression of customs closes off an important way of democratising the legal system.64  
 
It is argued that the result of understanding African law within the community in which 
an African law rule is alleged to apply, will have the effect of marrying official African law 
to the daily practices of those subject to it. To do this, the legislature and consequently, 
the judiciary, must then abandon their preference for the certainty apparently offered by 
the historical version of African law (alternatively the elusive stability of the common 
law) in favour of the continually changing custom when faced with disputes related to 
Africans. The recent Constitutional Court case of Mayelane v Ngwenyama provides 
affirmation of this by providing guidelines for the future interpretation of African law. It 
also supports the position that “African law must be understood on its own terms and 
not through the lens of common law.”65 This position will indeed find acceptance from 
African law advocates who have argued for nothing less since the inception of the 
recognition of African law in the South African Constitution.66 
In a report submitted by Professor Thandabantu Nhlapo, “Report on Appropriate 
Rituals” in respect to the North Gauteng case of children switched at birth, he advises a 
non-prescriptive approach in dealing with rituals that must be performed by the parties 
involved.67 This approach is one in which the communities themselves are allowed to 
decide what customs and rituals are appropriate for them. Professor Nhlapo argues that 
although the best interests of the child standard is often at times seen as a trump over 
customary law, it is a generalisation to assume that in African law a child’s best interests 
are irrelevant. He argues rather that the presumption is that the best interests of the 
child will usually be served by “belonging.” Moyo agrees with this presumption by 
similarly adding that family life and African law specifically involve a balancing of 
                                               
63 Ntlama (note 49 above) 35. 
64 Chanock (note 24 above) 57. 
65 Rautenbach (note 54 above) 172. 
66 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC). 
67 OR Tambo (note 5 above). 
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competing interests whereby a child’s best interests are of primary importance but are 
not paramount.68 
Conflicts of law are inevitable given the type of dual system of law which operates in 
South Africa. The African customary law rules outlined in the preceding pages have only 
been briefly dealt with by the general law of the land. Apart from the landmark decision 
in the Bhe case (which argued the unconstitutionality of primogeniture as applied in 
African law) the courts have not shown any willingness to develop African customary 
family law. As such, there is limited literature available on African family law and 
children’s rights pertaining to this particular aspect of the law. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives  
 
This study seeks to interrogate the principle of the best interests of the child in relation 
to African children switched at birth. Emanating from this, the following three questions 
are addressed: how are parental rights acquired and terminated in African law? How 
would the issue of children switched at birth best be solved using African values and 
rules? And whether this proposed resolution is compatible with the Constitution and the 
Children’s Act?69  
These questions are answered with the following conclusions in mind: 
(a) the rules of official African law are corrupt, inauthentic and lacking in authority or 
illegitimate,70  
(b) living African law would find in favour of lineage (epistemology) and naturally require 
that the children be returned to their biological parents and finally that,  
(c) the use of African dispute resolution is preferable in resolving matters of the African 
children switched at birth.71 
                                               
68 Moyo (note 23 above) 42. 
69 Customary law, African law, African indigenous law, native law and black law are used interchangeably. 
70 Costa 1998 SAJHR 525, 534. Id at 440 also points out that the oral tradition of African law makes it 
difficult to find credible jurisprudential sources and materials which have remained uncorrupted. 
71 Biological parent: refers to a child’s birth parent as a result of a contribution of biological material 
(Children’s Act Commentary). Parent: in relation to a child, includes the adoptive parent of a child, but 
excludes- 
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1.3 Methodology  
 
The methodology employed in this work was that of desk-top research. Therefore 
legislation and case law inter alia is utilised as its core sources for its literature. These 
were evaluated critically in order to present recommendations in a clear and logical 
manner.  
There was no collection of data or interviews performed in this work. This research 
analyses South African legislation that is relevant and generally applicable to African 
customary law and children. It examines how these instruments regulate the acquisition 
of parental rights and responsibilities of children switched at birth. This was done in 
order to provide guidelines on how the courts should apply and interpret African 
customary law in relation to African children switched at birth.  
1.4 The Theoretical Framework 
 
The thesis relied mainly on legislation and case law associated with children’s rights, 
and the core principles of African customary law. The researcher undertook a doctrinal 
legal research method. This method involved finding the law, analysing it and surmising 
the logical reasoning behind it.72 It used a mixture of rights based approach and 
normative approach as its theoretical framework.  Thus, the Children’s Act and African 
customary law literature served as the conceptual basis for this work.  
                                                                                                                                                       
(a) the biological father of a child conceived through the rape of or incest with the child’s mother 
(b) any person who is biologically related to a child by reason only of being a gamete donor for 
purposes of artificial fertilization; and 
(c) a parent whose parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a child have been terminated. 
72 Legal Research Methodology, available at 
http://epgp.inflibnet.ac.in/epgpdata/uploads/epgp_content/law/09._research_methodology/02._legal_rese
arch/et/8149_et_et.pdf, accessed on 26 November 2018.  
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The rights based approach is embedded in universal norms and standards. It focuses 
on process and outcome, emphasizes realizing rights, and recognizes individual and 
group rights as claims towards legal and moral duty bearers. It empowers individuals to 
claim their rights and focuses on structural causes and their manifestations.73 As such, it 
lends itself to some level of generality. As the research focuses on the lives, traditions 
and law of a specific grouping, African customary law is the point of departure for the 
use of this approach. This ultimately results in yielding different results than that 
achieved if should one opt to use the best interests of the child principle, as contained in 
the Children’s Act. 
The normative approach is equally valuable to this work in that it places an emphasis on 
building communities.74 The recognition of customary law as a primary source of law in 
South Africa and the focus on the development and advancement of African customary 
law justified the use of the normative approach herein. 
1.5 An Overview of the Chapter Breakdown 
 
This study is structured so that the first Chapter introduces the issues that the study 
deals with and the background which these issues are based upon. The second 
Chapter discusses the construction of a family in African societies and the parent/child 
relationship in African law. The third Chapter discusses the paramountcy principle in the 
Children’s Act emphasising its judicial constitutional interpretation. It determines the 
compatibility of the African law approach to children’s rights with the Constitution and 
the Children’s Act. It also considers the possibility of reconciliation between the African 
law approach to children’s rights and the paramountcy principle. Chapter four concludes 
this study by recommending on how family mediation as used in African law can be 
utilised as an alternative to a lengthy court battle to solve custody disputes of African 
children switched at birth.  
                                               
73 J Kirkemann Boesen  & T Martin , ‘Applying a rights based approach: An inspirational guide for civil 
society,’ The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2007 p9. 
74 Ibid. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
 
This study argues for consideration and accurate application of African law in judicial 
reasoning which is necessary towards achieving what is in the best interests of the 
African child born in a culturally and religiously diverse South Africa. It was argued that 
doing so would consequentially affirm African laws legitimacy as a primary source of law 
for Africans in South Africa. This study shall be of use to those that are affected by this 
traumatic experience in the following respects: 
- Parents awarded care will receive insight on the importance of involving the non-care 
giving parents in the lives of the child;  
- Counselors will understand the possible strain (legal and otherwise) each parent is 
under and therefore become better equipped to assist the parents and children alike in 
accepting the courts’ decision- whichever that might be; 
- The court will gain insight of the African laws position in matters involving children 
thereby interpreting and applying it correctly in instances where parties chose to be 
bound by it;  
- The growth of the debate on the application of African law will be advanced to reflect the 
realities of the majority of those subject to it in South Africa. 
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Chapter Two 
African Law and Children’s Rights: Are they consistent? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“The development of customary law in this matter is consonant with promoting the best 
interest of the minor child as envisaged in section 28(2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996.”75 
African law as described in Chapter One of this study is indigenous law that exists 
amongst various African communities and is generated and developed by the society in 
which it exists. Chapter two deals with African family law and children’s rights in 
particular. It discusses the meaning of parenthood, adoptions and appropriate rituals 
using the lens of African law. The rationale for doing so is to draw a conclusion on 
whether African law is consistent with children’s rights as articulated in section 28 of the 
Constitution. Alternatively, if the interests of children as understood in African law are so 
materially different from section 28 that the two could be regarded as foes.  
The primary purpose of this Chapter two, therefore, is to analyse how parental rights are 
acquired and terminated in African family law. The Chapter further emphasizes the 
importance African family law places on lineage. 
2.2 Parenthood – the African Child’s Reality 
 
A parent, is defined as “one who has begotten or born offspring.”76 This definition, 
however, is limited in that it only caters for biological parents. In contrast, the African 
society’s definition contains an expansive notion which states that a parent, most 
                                               
75 Maneli v Maneli 2010 (7) BCLR 703 (GSJ) at para 25.  
76 Oxford Concise Dictionary. See also RT Nhlapo, ‘Biological and social parenthood in African 
perspective: the movement of children in Swazi family law’ in J. Eekelaar and P Sarcevic, Parenthood in 
Modern Society (1993) 35. 
21 
 
particularly in African families, goes beyond biological ties.77 These parent-child 
relationships include any one of the following circumstances: adoption, fostering, ritual 
co-parenthood and step parenthood.78 Nhlapo marks the sole characteristic of these 
relationships as the “movement of children within or without a kinship group to be 
placed, temporarily or permanently with someone other than the biological parent.”79 
The word “parent” then, in most African societies, ascribes to it a more extended 
meaning than that of a nuclear family. This is because the family is often a unit that 
consists of “up to three generations of kin. Thus, a child in these circumstances may 
grow up regarding many individuals as mother, father and the likes.”80 It is in this regard, 
therefore, that Moyo asserts that concepts such as aunt, uncle and cousin do not 
necessarily exist in African families.81 This family structure amongst African societies is 
loosely described by Esther N Goody in her work on the Gonja of northern Ghana as 
pro-parenthood.82 Pro-parenthood, most commonly referred to as social parenting, 
relates to those “pro- parental institutions where the roles of parenthood are split, 
delegated or transferred while the link between the child and the biological parent 
remains intact.”83 This definition of social parenting must be differentiated from that of a 
non-biological, nurturing or psychological parent all of which refer to people who have 
no blood relation to the child but have raised the child and served as the child’s 
guardian.  
It is important to note at this juncture that while African societies favour social parenting 
as described formally, social parenting in the context of a non-biological parent who has 
no blood relation to the child is frowned upon. This is mostly a result of the fact that the 
                                               
77 Moyo (note 23 above) 40.  
78 EN Goody, ‘Kinship fostering in Gonja: deprivation or advantage?’ in Mayer (ed) Socialization: The 
Approach from Social Anthropology London (1970) 331. 
79 RT Nhlapo, ‘Biological and social parenthood in African perspective: the movement of children in Swazi 
family law’ in J. Eekelaar and P Sarcevic, Parenthood in Modern Society (1993) 35-50. 
80 A Campbell, ‘Conceiving Parents Through Law’ (2007) 21(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and 
Family 242- 273. 
81 Moyo (note 23 above) 40. 
82 Goody (note 75 above) 335. 
83 Ibid 335. 
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practice of “living African law” varies from one traditional society to the next.84 Many 
diverse ethnic groups exist in South Africa and, therefore, there are many indigenous 
laws. Pieterse accepts this concept and argues that the judiciary’s tendency to view all 
African law as largely similar promotes an idea of homogeneous ethnic groupings of 
black people in South Africa which, in his view, is vague and inaccurate.85 Furthermore, 
it is argued that such a view manipulates and justifies the “segregationist” policies of 
previous governments.86 
As such, the only form of parent-child relationships that is deemed most acceptable and 
which commonly exist amongst African societies, are those which take place within the 
extended family. Formal adoptions are a form of legally acquired “biological” parenthood 
since they involve the extinction of parental rights on the part of the biological parent 
and the alienation of them permanently to the adoptive parent.87 These adoptions, 
though prevalent in contemporary South African society, commonly take their form from 
legislation, inter alia, the Children’s Act. This, however, does not mean that adoptions 
that are not formalised in accordance with the prescribed formalities (as dictated to by 
the Children’s Act) cannot be recognised in our law. 
2.3 The Existence and Recognition of African Adoptions 
 
As mentioned earlier, different African ethnic groups exist in South Africa and there is, 
therefore, a variety of laws with very similar manifestations. This is evident in the case 
of Maneli v Maneli.88 Here, the court explained that “customary law adoption is widely 
practiced by Xhosas in the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces of the Republic of 
South Africa.”89 Briefly, the couple in these proceedings decided to adopt in terms of 
African law an eight month old female child whose biological parents were deceased. 
Xhosa traditional rites and rituals were performed to proclaim and signify to the world 
                                               
84 M Pieterse, ‘It’s a black thing: Upholding culture and customary law in a society founded on non-
racialism’ 2001 SAJHR 364. 
85 Ibid 364. 
86 Ibid 367. 
87 Bennet (note 36 above) 365; SM Poulter, Family Law and Litigation in Basotho Society (1976) 237. 
88 Maneli (note 72 above) 5. 
89 Maneli (note 72 above) 9. 
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that the adoptive parents have formally accepted parental responsibility for the minor 
child. Following the breakdown of the parties’ marital relationship, a dispute in respect of 
the maintenance of the minor child arose. The court was called to decide whether the 
adoptive father had a legal duty to maintain the child since the couple in the duration of 
their marriage and subsequent customary adoption of the child had not regulated the 
adoption in terms of legislation. In short, the court found that “a child adopted in 
accordance with Xhosa customary law should be deemed to be legally adopted in terms 
of the common law and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,” thus finding 
the adoptive father liable for maintenance.90  Further in Kewana v Santam Insurance Co 
Ltd the court found that a duty of support derived from an African law adoption was 
enforceable and that the child was entitled to compensation for a loss of support 
resulting from the negligent killing of the child’s adoptive father.91 The court’s willingness 
to accept and recognise the existence of African law adoptions was also seen in the 
case of Metiso v Padongelukfonds.92 The court held that an African law adoption was 
valid for the purposes of the children’s claim for loss of support against the Road 
Accident Fund.  
Whilst the development and application of African law with regard to adoptions have 
been observed, the question that remains to be answered is, what gives effect to a 
customary adoption. The court stated in the Maneli case that the adoption of the minor 
child was done after the performance of Xhosa traditional rites and rituals. This 
suggests that it is possible to put into effect a customary adoption through the 
performance of appropriate rituals that satisfy the requirements of African law as 
prescribed by the society in which they exist and are applied. 
 
 
 
                                               
90 Maneli (note 72 above) 12. 
91 1993 (4) SA 771 (Tka). 
92 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T).  
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2.4 Appropriate Rituals 
 
The Constitution of South Africa promotes cultural diversity in the nation. It does this by 
guaranteeing the rights to culture and cultural observances.93 As mentioned previously, 
these rights are recognised or conferred to the “extent that they are consistent with the 
bill of rights.”94 The African law recognised by the Constitution as an equal component 
with others in the South African legal system, is the “living African law” of communities 
as manifested in their daily practices as opposed to the official African law developed 
during the apartheid era.95 This requirement thus makes it crucial that the court or any 
tribunal purporting to apply African law ascertain the content of African rules by leaning 
towards textbooks, cases and expert opinions. The South African Law Commission 
Report on Conflict on Laws also suggests that assessors from communities in which a 
rule is alleged to apply be appointed for this purpose.96 
Legislation constitutes appropriate rituals to be performed to put into effect an African 
adoption as seen in section 3(1)(b) of the Customary Marriages Act, and refrains from 
prescribing detailed procedural observances whenever an African law criterion has to 
be fulfilled. This section of the Customary Marriages Act merely prescribes that “the 
marriage be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with African law.” 
This circumvents prescribing uniform rules for all indigenous ethic groups and thus 
gives room to each community and ethnicity to marry according to their own rules. It is 
Nhlapo’s submission that this non-prescriptive approach found in legislation provides a 
good example of how one could resolve the issue of appropriate rituals to be performed 
to put into effect an African adoption. In the absence of any guidelines as to what 
                                               
93 Section 15(3), section 30, section 31, section 211 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. 
94 Section 39(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also (note 25 above) 16. 
95 Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC). The legal system of the country is dual in 
its nature, consisting of Roman Dutch law and African South African law. Both of these systems of law 
are at the mercy of the Bill of Rights which dictates that when interpreting them (African law or common 
law); the court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
96 South African Law Commission Report on Conflict of Law (Project 90) September (1999). 
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constitutes the necessary appropriate rituals required to put into effect such an 
adoption, one is left with no other alternative but to concede and accept Nhlapo’s 
argument. Nhlapo’s argument is also in line with the reasoning of the Alexkor judgement 
which held that the African law recognised by the Constitution is the living African law of 
communities as revealed by their day to day practices.97 Thus, Nhlapo argues that the 
most significant aspect of African family law is the communal or group ethic which 
pervades kinship and that this attitude continues to underpin contemporary African law 
(regardless of their origins) in the needs of pre-industrial society.98 Nhlapo uses the idea 
of a marriage as an alliance between two kinship groups for the purposes of realising 
goals beyond the immediate interests of the particular wife and husband.99 As such, 
African law continues to exhibit a marked loyalty to the communal ethic and group 
solidarity. 
One applauds the development of African law in this respect, as it dismisses the 
ideology that African law has remained static since its conception. Whilst it appears at 
first glance that the “paramountcy principle” in the Children’s Act trumps African law 
where the rules of affiliation, custody and guardianship are concerned, this is not the 
case. In African law, the “best interests of the child” are not treated as irrelevant or 
subservient to any other competing interests. Rather, there is a presumption (due to the 
communitarian nature of African societies) that the child’s individual interests are 
inherently linked to the interests of the family and society at large and that these 
interests are best served by a sense of “belonging.”100 African law, when viewed 
through this lens, is not at war with children’s rights but rather better contextualises 
human relationships by adopting a family-based approach to an otherwise individualistic 
principle.101 This understanding of African family law in relation to how it interprets 
children’s rights thus answers the question of whether African law is compatible to 
                                               
97 Alexkor (note 92 above). 
98 RT Nhlapo, ‘Family law and women’s rights: friends or foes?’Acta Juridica 1991: 135-146. 
99 Ibid 138. 
100 Nhlapo (note 76 above) 35. 
101 A Moyo, ‘Reconceptualising the paramountcy principle: Beyond the individualistic construction of the 
best interests of the child’ 2012 AHRLJ 142. 
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children’s rights. When viewed through the lens described, African law is indeed 
consistent with children’s rights. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
It is thus evident that African society extends the meaning of parenthood beyond the 
scope of the European nuclear family. Furthermore, the assimilation of children into the 
family is a grave concern in African family law. Though African family law commonly 
exercises social parenting, this is mostly limited to where the “roles of parenthood are 
split, delegated or transferred whilst maintaining the link between the biological parent 
and child.”102 As seen above, this rule is not without exception as African adoptions do 
exist and have been acknowledged by the courts. As the African law interpretation of 
children’s rights has been dealt with extensively in this Chapter, the next Chapter 
explores the constitutional interpretation and framework of the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
102 Goody (note 75 above) 333. 
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Chapter Three 
The Best Interests of the Child: The Constitutional Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
“It is important to avoid an unfortunate but prevalent tendency to put customary law and 
the constitutional principle of equality on a collision course, i.e. to say that for the one to 
live, the other must die, or to use a less dramatic metaphor, if customs triumphs, equality 
must fail [or vice versa]. I think this is a profoundly mistaken view. Our Bill of Rights is 
not based on a hierarchy of rights, nor is it an assemblage of categorically defined rights 
sealed off from each other. Rather it contemplates the interdependence of mutually 
supportive rights.”103 
 
This Chapter discusses the history of the rights of children in the South African context. 
To this end, section 28 of the Constitution and its subsequent domestication into 
national legislation are evaluated. Thus, the scope of this Chapter entails the 
interpretation and application of the best interests of the child standard using the 
Constitution and the Children’s Act as its yardstick. It also examines whether this 
interpretation of children’s rights as articulated in the Constitution, may be amalgamated 
with African law’s interpretation of the same to reach consensus. 
3.2 The Interpretation of Section 28 
 
Section 28 of the South African Constitution sets out a montage of rights which provides 
for the protection of children.104 This section, inter alia, gives children the right to a 
                                               
103 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyuandai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd; in re 
Hyuandai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others (2000) ZACC 12, 2001 (1) SA 
545 (CC) 2000 (10) BCLR 1078 (CC) at para 21. 
104 Johan de Waal & Iain Currie, Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed. (2013) 599. 
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name and nationality at birth. It also provides for the right to family or parental care.105 In 
2005, the legislature enacted new legislation in the form of the Children’s Act 38 of 
2005, which set out the rights of children and the rights and responsibilities of parents 
and other duty bearers in respect to those rights.106 Thus, when interpreting children’s 
rights it is important to strike a balance between a child’s need for autonomy and his or 
her need for protection. Consequently, parental rights are derived from children’s need 
for protection and thus decrease as the child gets older.107  This principle is aptly 
provided for by the existence of section 36 of the Constitution. This section 
encapsulates the tension present in the rights contained in the Bill of Rights which 
                                               
105 Section 28(1)(a)-(b). Care: in relation to a child, includes, where appropriate-  
(a) within available means, providing the child with: 
- a suitable place to live 
- living conditions that are conducive to the child’s health, well-being and development; and 
- the necessary financial support 
(b) safeguarding and promoting the well-being of the child 
(c) protecting the child from maltreatment, abuse, neglect, degradation, discrimination, exploitation 
and any other physical, emotional or moral harm or hazards; 
(d) respecting, protecting, promoting and securing the fulfilment of, and guarding against any 
infringement of, the child’s rights set out in the Bill of Rights and the principles set out in chapter 2 
of the Children’s Act 
(e) guiding, directing and securing the child’s education and upbringing, including religious and 
cultural education and upbringing, in a manner appropriate to the child’s age, maturity and stage 
of development 
(f) guiding, advising and assisting the child in decisions to be taken by the child in a manner 
appropriate to the child’s age, maturity and stage of development 
(g) guiding the behaviour of the child in a humane manner 
(h) maintaining a sound relationship with the child 
(i) accommodating any special needs that the child may have, and 
generally, ensuring that the best interests of the child is the paramount concern in all matters concerning 
the child. 
106 Parental rights and responsibilities: includes the responsibility and the right to care for the child, to 
maintain contact with the child, to act as guardian of the child and to contribute to the maintenance of the 
child. Other legislation governing children and their rights include the South African Schools Act 84 of 
1996; the Criminal Law Amendment Act 32 of 2007 and the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
107 The responsibilities and rights mentioned herein are contact and guardianship. Contact: in relation to a 
child, means- 
(a) maintain a personal relationship with the child, and 
(b) if the child is with someone else- 
- communication on a regular basis with the child in person, including- 
- visiting or being visited by the child 
- communication on a regular basis with the child in any manner, including- 
- through the post or any other form of communication 
Guardian: a parent or other person who has guardianship of a child who, administers and safeguards the 
child’s property interests, assists or represents the child in administrative, contractual and other legal 
matters and gives alternatively refuses to give consent required by law in respect of the child. 
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provides that “individual constitutional provisions may not be interpreted in isolation but 
in light of the Constitution as a whole.”108 
In 1995 South Africa ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
subsequent to which in the year 2000, it ratified the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. These international instruments were then domesticated into 
national law by the Children’s Act. This fact notwithstanding, Skelton asserts that the 
Constitutional Court has found that some “post-constitutional statutes” have failed to 
measure up to the standard as set out by section 28.109 The Constitutional Court has 
thus stressed that section 28 and, indeed, domestic legislation and policies alike must 
be interpreted in such a way that is seen to be an expansive response to South Africa’s 
obligations. This is consistent with the international instruments such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Child to which it is a party.110 
 
3.3 The Judicial Application of the Children’s Act and Section 28 of the 
Constitution 
 
As discussed in Chapter one of this study, the best interest of the child is an established 
common law principle that is articulated in our Constitution and national legislation. 
International law also obliges state parties to adhere to this principle in matters where 
children are involved.111 Whenever the best interests of the child are to be applied, 
many factors, as contained in the Children’s Act, are considered.112 Over the years the 
                                               
108 C Rautenbach, ‘A family home, five sisters and the rule of ultimogeniture: Comparing notes on judicial 
approaches to customary law in South Africa and Botswana’ (2016) African Human Rights Law Journal 
16. 
109 This is evident in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (6) 
SA 632 (CC) where the court held section 51 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act infringed 
children’s rights to detention as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period of time as guaranteed 
by section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution. 
110 Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC) 29. 
111 Article 3(1) of the CRC, 1987 describes the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. The 
ARCWC in article 4(1) places a higher onus in that it states that the best interests of the child must be the 
primary consideration. The South African Constitution however has raised the bar to that of paramountcy 
112 Section 7(1) a-n of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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judiciary has developed guidelines on how the best interests of the child are to be 
applied in practice. 
In French v French the court set out four categories which must be considered when 
deciding where a child should be placed in keeping with the best interests of the child 
standard and these categories are: 
“(a) The preservation of the child’s sense of security. 
 (b) The suitability of the care giving parent.113 
 (c) The material considerations of both parents. 
 (d) The wishes of the child.” 114 
 
It is notable, therefore, that whom the child should stay with is located within an 
important and complicated lacuna within family law. The legal mantra on the best 
interests of the child, as contained in the abovementioned international instruments and 
family legislation, is the overriding standard in deciding this issue. As previously 
discussed, all matters concerning the awarding of parental rights and responsibilities 
are within the High Courts’ and Children’s Courts’ domain and such decisions are made 
in the light of this standard.  
In South Africa, such rights are generally automatically acquired by parents by virtue of 
biology.115 Below is a brief comparative study of a history of cases bearing markedly 
                                               
113 This is to be established by enquiring into the fitness of the parents character, religion, language and 
the fitness of the parent to guide the moral, cultural and religious development of the child. 
114 1971 (4) SA 298.  
115 As conferred by the operation of section 19. The only exception (though not relevant in this case) 
being where the mother is a child herself. Further unmarried fathers do not automatically acquire full 
parental rights and responsibilities and only do so in terms of section 21 of the Children’s Act which 
provides that unmarried biological fathers acquire full parental rights and responsibilities in the following 
circumstances:  
a) If at the time of the child’s birth he is living with the mother in a permanent life partnership; or 
b) If regardless of whether he has lived or is living with the mother- 
i) Consents to be identified or successfully applies in terms of section 26 to be identified as 
the child’s father or pays damages in terms of customary law 
ii) Contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute to the child’s upbringing for a 
reasonable period; and 
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similar facts with the exclusion of the race and culture of the children involved. In the 
two South African cases, an analysis is made on how the court has previously dealt with 
the issue of children switched at birth prior to the promulgation of the Constitution and 
the Children’s Act. The American case dealt with herein highlights the similarities and 
differences on the approach of the courts on the issue of the rights of all affected parties 
in cases of children who have been switched at birth.  
A) South Africa  
Petersen en ‘n Ander v Kruger en ‘n Ander116 
In this matter, the children were negligently switched shortly after birth and the 
applicants sought the court to have their biological child returned to them. The court 
held that although the best interests of the child were most important, the rights of the 
parents may not be disregarded. It held that the personal characteristics of the 
applicants, their family life, their domestic circumstances and their morals and values 
constituted no threat to their biological child. The court further held that the child would 
not suffer any permanent damage because of granting the application which was 
subsequently successful. 
Clinton- Parker v Administrator, Transvaal Dawkins v Administrator, Transvaal117 
On the 17th day of February 1989, the plaintiffs were admitted to the maternity ward in 
Nigel Hospital and gave birth to boys. Because of the negligent conduct of the staff 
acting within the course and scope of their employment, the children were switched. 
Neither of the parents were aware of this fact until or about the 26th day of November 
1990. They, amongst themselves, decided and agreed not to return the children to their 
natural parents and only approached the court for a claim of damages against the 
hospital. 
                                                                                                                                                       
iii) Contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute towards expenses in connection 
with the maintenance of the child for a reasonable period. 
116 1975 (4) SA 171 (C).  
117 1996 (2) SA 37 (W). A valid case for civil damages based on delict or alternatively breach of contract 
exists in this matter but however exceeds the ambit of this work and will thus not be discussed. 
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B) United States of America 
Twiggs v Mays118 
During the month of July 1988, the Twiggs discovered that the child in their care, 
“Arlena” who subsequently passed because of a heart defect was not their biological 
daughter and that the Mays had gone home with their biological child, Kimberley. A 
series of blood tests confirmed that Kimberley Mays was in fact the Twiggs’ biological 
daughter and the parties agreed to a visitation plan and schedule. Following a 
breakdown in the parties’ relationship, the Twiggs sought to enforce visitation rights with 
Kimberley and have their legal status as parents recognised.  The court found that it 
was in the child’s best interest to maintain the legal status quo thereby Kimberley 
remained in the care of her psychological father. 
3.3.1 A Synthesis of the Peterson, Clinton and Twiggs cases  
 
It is important to juxtapose and analyse these three cases as they are the same as the 
current case before the North Gauteng High Court.119 The rationale for doing so is to 
determine whether a similar conclusion will be reached. The Petersen case was 
decided prior to the final Constitution and the enactment of the Children’s Act. This 
distinction is important for the reason that the paramountcy principle contained in both 
the Constitution and the Children’s Act imposes a stricter requirement than that which 
applies in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereinafter referred to as UNCRC and 
ACRWC respectively) all of which were applicable during the time this case was 
decided.120  
The above international instruments render the interests of the child a “primary” 
consideration in all matters concerning children. The use of the word primary as 
contained in the UNCRC and ACRWC suggests that the child’s interests are ranked first 
                                               
118 543 So.2d 241- 1989. 
119 OR Tambo (note 7 above). 
120 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 and African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1990 respectively. 
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in the order of principal importance in matters concerning children whilst the ordinary 
meaning of the word paramount suggests that the interests of the child must be 
considered above anything else. In Petersen the court held that whilst the children’s 
best interests were most important, the rights of the parents could not be disregarded. 
This balancing of the rights is indicative of the court’s recognition that the rights of 
children switched at birth cannot be interpreted in isolation to the rights of the parents 
affected by this uncommon situation. Thus, the approach adopted in the Petersen case 
considers the primary interests of the child in a meaningful way without unduly 
obliterating the rights of the parents. Whilst the return of children switched at birth to 
their biological parents was not an issue before the court in the Clinton case, the court’s 
omission to deal with it as the upper guardian of children and as a custodian of their 
rights furthered the rationale of the balancing of rights adopted by the court in the 
Petersen case. These two cases are in keeping with the principle that the rights of 
children switched at birth should not be interpreted in isolation but must give due 
recognition of other factors relevant in this regard.  
The American case of Twiggs, however, is the most likely outcome of the present case 
before the North Gauteng High Court. In Twiggs, the best interests of the child were of 
paramount importance and little, if any, value was given to the rights of those who had 
birthed the child in question. Judgment in respect of the North Gauteng High Court case 
had not yet been handed down at the time this study was undertaken.121 An order, 
however, dated 17 November 2015, ruled that the children were to remain in the care of 
their social parent.122 The reasoning behind this order and the legal status of the 
parents (in respect of their biological child and the child in their care) will only be clear 
once judgment is released. However, it is evident that the child-centred approach to 
children’s rights adopted by South African courts superimposes the best interests of the 
child over and above the parental rights and responsibilities of the biological parents of 
                                               
121 A number of attempts made by curator ad litem Ann Skelton (Centre for Child Law) to obtain judgment 
proved fruitless. 
122 Non-biological /psychological/social and nurturing parent: Refers to people who have no blood relation 
to the child but have raised the child and served as the child’s guardian. ‘The Medical Dictionary’ 
available at medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/social+mother accessed on 23 June 2016. 
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children switched at birth.123A child centred approach to children’s rights as articulated 
above, is one which respects and values children. It involves considering the impact of 
decisions and processes involving children, whilst also seeking their input in relation to 
same.124 
There are only two reported cases of children switched at birth in South Africa which 
have been mentioned briefly above.125 It is worth noting that in both these cases the 
children were of Western descent. This is an important fact given the fact that the 
interpretation of children’s rights jurisprudence (to its Western counterparts) could not 
be faulted. This new case, however, (as ordered on the 17th of November 2015) is a 
category of its own. The distinctive feature in this matter is that the parties involved are 
of African descent. This singlehandedly introduces an array of issues that fall squarely 
within the domain of African family law. Whilst much has been written on the topic of 
children’s rights, little discussion has been led on the constitutional legitimacy of African 
law generally and children switched at birth in particular.126 
In relation to the matter at hand, it follows then that NN acquired these rights concerning 
N as soon as she was born. Likewise, NS acquired same with Z as soon as he was 
born.127 As these children were switched at birth, neither of these parents exercised 
these responsibilities and rights in respect to their own children. As such, they merely 
have de facto and not de jure rights and responsibilities to the child they currently live 
with. As argued in this study, it is the High Court (as the upper guardian of children) that 
needs to make an order to regulate the legal responsibilities and rights between the 
parents and children in this matter.  
                                               
123 Heaton describes the child centred approach required in these individual cases as: “Everybody or 
person who has to determine the child’s best interests in light of the individual child’s position and the 
effect that the individual child’s circumstances are having or will probably have on the child.’’ (2009) 34(2) 
Journal for Juridical Science 9. 
124 R Sinclair, Participation in practice: Making it meaningful, effective and sustainable, Children and 
Society 2004(18) 2 108. 
125 Note 113 and 114 above. 
126 With the exclusion of the discussion of the rights of illegitimate children in intestate succession claims.  
127 In relation to the fathers of the children it is understood that neither of the fathers were married to the 
mothers at the time of their biological child’s birth. It is further understood that neither was living with the 
mother in a permanent life partnership at the time of his biological child’s birth. As such, both fathers’ 
have no rights whatsoever to the child that resides with them as these children are not their biological 
children as required by section 21 of the Children’s Act. 
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The High Court has the power to terminate, extend, suspend or restrict any or all 
parental rights and responsibilities. In the case of children switched at birth, it is 
arguably relatively easy for the court to simply grant parental rights and responsibilities 
to each parent in respect to the child currently in their care through the application of 
sections 23 and 24 of the Children’s Act. This option, however, was excluded by the 
court for the following reasons: firstly, an order does not deal with issues emanating 
from intestate succession and secondly, it is doubtful that an order made under the 
Children’s Act has any life-long effect. If one follows this reasoning, a mere declaration 
of parental responsibilities and rights would not fully protect the children involved.  
Another possibility the court could consider in this instance would be that of adoption. 
This option, whilst most feasible because it solves the legal problems mentioned above, 
was also disqualified by the court because it seemed likely that under the current law, 
children switched at birth would not necessarily qualify as “adoptable 
children.”128Another difficulty present with the option of formal adoption proceedings is 
found in section 231 of the Children’s Act (persons who may adopt a child). This section 
makes it difficult for couples to adopt jointly if they are not spouses, life partners or co-
habitants. This leaves the court with only one option which is to make an order for the 
recognition of the de facto adoption of the children.  
As discussed in Chapter one, a de facto adoption is one where (as explained in the 
Flynn case) the parties enjoy a close enough relationship such that they ought to be 
considered parent and child. The Flynn case also refers to a decision in the High Court 
of American Samoa (Estate of Tuinanau Fuinaono (Deceased) PR Nos 13-86 and 23-
86, 10 November 1992) in which a de facto adoption is defined as one which exists 
when:  
                                               
128 According to section 280(3) a child is adoptable if: 
a) The child is an option and has no guardian or caregiver who is willing to adopt the child; 
b) The whereabouts of the child’s parents or guardian cannot be established; 
c) The child has been abandoned; 
d) The child’s parent or guardian has abused or deliberately neglected the child or has allowed the 
child to be abused or deliberately neglected; or  
e) The child is in need of a permanent alternative parent. 
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“......a descendant performs parental duties towards a child in his household and the 
child performs filial obligations in rerum exactly equivalent to a formally adopted child.”129 
 
Another concept similar to that of a de facto adoption that US law recognises is known 
as an “equitable adoption.” Foot recommends it in the case of children switched at birth 
and notes that: 
“If a person is willing is to assume responsibility for support of a child and wants to be 
recognised as the parent, then under certain circumstances that person may be 
considered a parent who is entitled to receive custody or visitation rights. The alternative 
of equitable adoption gives both parents an equal chance to gain custody of the child 
and allows for a compromise of joint custody of the children. Equitable adoption provides 
the psychological parent an opportunity to act as an equitably adoptive parent. Using the 
theory of equitable adoption gives both the biological and psychological parents an equal 
chance to seek custody and visitation rights. Putting them on equal footing allows the 
court to bypass all the parental rights problems and go straight to the pertinent issue: the 
best interests of the child.”130 
 
The option of de facto adoption is desirable in this instance not only for its convenience 
but also because there is nothing in the Children’s Act that expressly precludes informal 
adoptions from being recognised. Further to this, the use of this option was not only 
suggested by the curator ad litem, Dr Ann Skelton from Centre of Child Law but was 
also endorsed and accepted by the court in this matter.131 Applying this option ensures 
that all the parties have full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the children 
that they have raised and also provides that each parent has the right of contact 
(section 18(2) of the Children’s Act) in respect of  their biological child. Section 33 of the 
Children’s Act was used to resolve the issue of parental responsibilities and rights 
because this section does not require that parties have full parental responsibilities and 
                                               
129 2009 (1) SA 584 (C) at para 44. 
130 Foot (note 11 above) 338. 
131 OR Tambo (note 7 above). 
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rights in respect of a child. Furthermore, paragraph 14 of the final order of the court 
ensures that the therapeutic support and integration programme provided by the Child 
and Adolescent Family Unit continues until the parties agree that the service should 
cease. This programme allows for the following phases of treatment:132 
The first phase provides for trauma counselling and support through the shock of the 
news of the baby swap. In the second phase the two mothers are carefully introduced to 
each other to facilitate a support approach to the two mothers. The third phase slowly 
introduces the children to the different mothers and facilitates the building of new 
attachment bonds with their biological mothers. The fourth phase involves the following 
possible care and contact permutations which entail that if the mothers elect to keep 
their current psychological children, contact with their biological children needs to be 
facilitated and supervised. Moreover, if the mothers elect to return their current children 
in favour of having their biological children, contact with their psychological children 
needs to be facilitated and supervised. Lastly, in the case of a care or contact dispute, 
the High Court needs to make a finding regarding parental responsibilities and rights. 
The fifth and final phase of the programme provides on-going monitoring and treatment 
of the children to manage the care/contact experiences for any future emotional issues 
that might arise as the children grow older. In addition to this is the parental and family 
therapy required for the parents and family as the children grow older. 
3.4 Possible Reconciliation: African Law Approach to Children’s Rights and 
the Best Interests of the Child 
 
The colonial conquest of South Africa by the Dutch and the British has had long term 
devastating effects on Africans. These more than three hundred and fifty years of 
oppression cannot be ignored. Apartheid emphasised the differences between 
Europeans and Africans and encouraged the supremacy of the formers values. It is 
common knowledge that the European culture is individualistic in its nature whilst the 
African culture is characterised by its communalistic and kinship orientation. This 
                                               
132 OR Tambo (note 7 above). The order was given on the 17th of November 2015 and judgment has to 
date not been provided for by the court. 
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practice is best evidenced in the concept of ubuntu which Ndima describes as 
“embracing all the notions of universal human interdependence which encourage 
collective survival.”133 Readers are thus cautioned to consider African law against this 
understanding and not perpetuate the stereotype eloquently described by Ndima as one 
that “associates the West with progress and Africa with stagnation.”134   
There are different conceptions of family between western and non-western countries 
and these have important implications in understanding children’s rights. It has been 
said that when it comes to custody and various child related issues, western law 
conceptualises custody, which is access to the child, in terms of an individual’s right 
over his child. African law, on the other hand, conceptualises custody in terms of familial 
and transgeneral rights.135 The preamble of the ACRWC acknowledges this by noting 
the importance of traditions and cultural values and reflecting on the conceptions of 
children’s rights. It recognises the virtues of African heritage, historical background and 
values of African civilization and inspires the characteristics of the rights and welfare of 
the child and jurisprudential concepts such as ubuntu to reconceptualise African 
jurisprudence in its indigenous perspective.136    
The aim of this study was not to challenge the applicability of the best interests of the 
child standard in South Africa, but rather to canvass it from an African jurisprudence 
perspective to determine the best outcome in the current case of African children 
switched at birth. Put differently, the primary purpose of this study was to determine the 
correct approach to the legal status of the parents in relation to African children 
switched at birth. The importance of such an exercise cannot be overstated. Ndima 
warns against the danger of administering African law from a Western perspective and 
correctly concludes that doing so is the core contributor to its degeneration.137  
                                               
133 D Ndima, ‘Reconceiving African jurisprudence in a post-imperial society: the role of ubuntu in 
constitutional adjudication’ XLVIII CILSA 2015 381. 
134 Ibid 383. 
135 A Armstrong, ‘School and Sadza: Custody and the best interests of the child in Zimbabwe’ in P Alston 
(ed) The Best Interests of the Child: Reconciling culture and Human Rights op cit note 5 at 158. See also 
Moyo (note 101 above). 
136 Note 98 above. 
137 See note 130 above at para 12. 
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It has been argued in Chapter two that the meaning of parenthood in African societies 
often consists of members of the extended family. Thus, in such circumstances, an 
African child may grow up referring to many people as father, mother, brother and the 
like. It has also been shown that the migration of children in African societies often takes 
place within the extended family whilst the link between the biological parent and the 
child is maintained. Of importance to note, therefore, is the fact that in indigenous 
societies, the father has very strong rights to his child. This is regardless of whether he 
chooses to exercise these rights or not. This is evidenced in African communities when 
siblings introduce the other sibling in a group setting by referring to them as sende 
linye.138 This description emphasises the link between both individuals stemming from 
their paternal heritage as opposed to their maternal heritage as it is the father’s lineage 
that is regarded to be of more importance than that of the mother. 
In Southern African countries it is common for children to spend extended periods of 
time with extended family members such as grandparents, uncles, aunts and the like. 
This is the accepted inheritance of migrant labour. It is for this reason that custody 
disputes of African children switched at birth becomes even more complicated. The 
affiliation and movement of children both within the lineage and outside it is a matter of 
grave concern in African law. This study has provided suggestions on how the issue of 
African children switched at birth could be resolved within an African family. It has 
shown that though the term “parent” ascribes to it an extended meaning in African law, it 
relates to those institutions where the roles of parenthood are split, delegated or 
transferred whilst maintaining the link between the child and the biological parent.139 
Consequently, whilst African societies favour social parenting within the lineage, it is not 
easily accepted in instances where no blood relation exists. 
The question to be addressed here is what it is that is in the best interest of an African 
child switched at birth. The distinction is made in this instance for two reasons. Now, 
being that the children whom this study is based upon are of African descent. Moreover, 
because of this fact, conflict of law is inevitable because of the type of dual system of 
                                               
138 Sende linye ( a Zulu idiom) can be translated as the child of my fathers loins. 
139 Goody (note 75 above) 335. 
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law which operates in South Africa. In introducing this study, it was stated that the 
courts finding in relation to children of western descent could not be faulted given that 
the judiciary has not substantially dealt with African family law particularly in respect of 
children switched at birth. As such, it is apparent that the African law rules spoken of 
above have only been briefly touched upon by the general law of the land.  
In the case of children switched at birth, two children are involved. Each of these 
children is with their own set of biological parents, who, through circumstance cannot be 
faulted for loving a child that is not their own. It would be unreasonable to disregard the 
love they have in respect to the child that they have raised. It can, however, be argued 
that this love was instilled by the incorrect assumption of having birthed the child. It 
follows then that these parents have a great interest vested in their own biological child. 
As such, it is submitted that although the best interests of the child are important, the 
rights of their biological parents should not be viewed as being subservient to those of 
the child. Doing so may have the effect of placing one child in a better position than the 
other. This may occur socially, financially or otherwise. Due to the communitarian nature 
of African societies, the child’s individual rights are inherently linked to the interests of 
the family and society at large. This is not, however, to suggest that the child’s interests 
are deemed subservient or irrelevant but rather that these interests are best served 
when the child’s lineage is not easily interfered with by placing him or her in a family that 
they have no blood relation too. This is due to the fact that in African law it is by 
belonging that a child’s best interests are best protected.140 If one is to apply 
understanding of both the constitutional interpretation of children’s rights and the African 
law’s approach to the subject, it is easier to establish a possible cohesion between the 
two. At the heart of both interpretations of children’s rights, it is submitted that the best 
interests of the child are indeed served. 
 
 
                                               
140 Moyo (note 98 above) 146.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
The best interests of the child standard poses as the overarching theme in all matters 
and decisions related to children. This includes African children switched at birth. The 
African law recommendation of returning the switched children to their biological parents 
and social parenting the child they have grown to know as their own (in the form of 
extended family members) is not at opposite ends with the paramountcy principle. 
Chapter Four, therefore, provides recommendations on how the sensitive issue of 
African children switched at birth can best be solved using African dispute resolution. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1      Introduction 
 
“It is important to avoid an unfortunate but prevalent tendency to put customary law and 
the constitutional principle of equality on a collision course, i.e. to say that for the one to 
live, the other must die, or to use a less dramatic metaphor, if customs triumphs, equality 
must fail [or vice versa]. I think this is a profoundly mistaken view. Our Bill of Rights is 
not based on a hierarchy of rights, nor is it an assemblage of categorically defined rights 
sealed off from each other. Rather it contemplates the interdependence of mutually 
supportive rights.”141 
The object of this study has been to determine what is in the best interests of an African 
child switched at birth. The prior Chapters discussed at length the definition of African 
law and the acquisition and termination of parental rights and responsibilities in African 
law. They have also examined whether African law is compatible with children’s rights 
as articulated in section 28 of the Constitution and if not, whether a reconciliation 
between the two could be made. 
Chapter Four concludes the study by proposing a means by which this dilemma of 
African children switched at birth may be resolved. The method proposed and 
discussed herein is that of African dispute resolution. The strengths and weaknesses of 
this proposed method are discussed in conjunction with the combined use of parental 
co-ordination using parental agreements.   
4.2 The Use of African Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in African Family Law 
 
Conflict resolution methods used in African societies are not only conciliatory in nature 
but are also therapeutic. At the heart of African law adjudication “lies the notion of 
                                               
141 A Sachs, ‘Towards the Liberation and Revitalization of Customary Law’ Pre-Dinner address at 
Southern African Society of Legal historians Conference on ‘Law in Africa: New Perspectives on origins, 
foundations and transition’. Held at Roodevallei Country Lodge, Pretoria on 13-15 January 1999 at page 
15. 
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reconciliation and restoration of harmony.”142 Disputants, in an interpersonal setting are 
educated through social learning which encourages them to resolve their differences 
with the assistance of people familiar to them such as one’s own senior family 
members. These senior family members ordinarily consist of grandparents, elderly 
aunts and uncles from both sides of the family. The involvement of senior family 
members or patriarchs to the resolution of family disputes is indicative of the African 
culture’s insistence on proper consultation. The role of senior family members or 
patriarchs in these processes “less to find the facts, state the rules of law and apply 
them to the facts but rather to set right a wrong in such a way as to restore harmony 
within the disturbed community.”143This is aimed at not only at generating the different 
views of extended family generally considered as secondary mothers, fathers and 
siblings (as opposed to aunts, uncles and cousins), but also ensuring that authority has 
duly been recognised in matters of life-changing importance. Without claiming any 
conflict resolution expertise, it is submitted that the same can be traced into the 
foundations of African law. This is done to promote group solidarity in the form of a 
collective effort in seeking the wisest and most harmonious possible solution as 
opposed to seeking legal victory according to individual autonomy. 
 
The African law procedure described above is inquisitorial and flexible in its nature. It is 
this flexibility of procedure that enables both the parties to feel that everything has been 
done to seek and attain justice. African dispute resolution therefore, does not seek to 
replace the courts in matters involving African children switched at birth but hopes to 
amalgamate the court’s legal procedures with African family mediation, with the latter 
holding more weight than is currently the case. 
 
Admittedly, the African law model is not without its complexities. Thus, it is conceded 
that the picture presented of African law and its functions and purposes in African 
societies looks overly romantic and presumptuous. Indeed, in the said scenario of 
                                               
142 Peri H Alkas JD & Wayne MD, ‘HIV and Aids in Africa: African policies in response to AIDS in relation 
to various national legal traditions’ (1996) 17(4) Journal of Legal Medicine 527-546. 
143 CRM Dlamini, ‘The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs’ 1991 Acta Juridica 82. 
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children switched at birth, there is a myriad of possibilities that cause a deeper 
convolution in resolving the matter. To begin with, this romantic representation of 
African law and those subject to it depends upon the agreement of the parties involved. 
These parties may actually opt for common law intervention through the courts and not 
necessarily African law intervention.144 It further presumes that at any given point, 
parties caught in this abnormal situation have available and willing, senior family 
members willing to assist them in resolving this issue. Most important is the requirement 
that the said senior members are able and equally willing to act in the best interests of 
the child as the Courts and the Children’s Act can–assuming they know what those best 
interests are.145 This representation of the role of African law in sensitive situations 
involving African South Africans further assumes that the dependency of the courts on 
fact-finding and acting in accordance with the rules of law, means that the court cannot 
and will not treat the matter with sensitivity and empathy – which is a fallacy.146 To 
conclude, perhaps the most devastating effect that this romantic tendency has had on 
African society, is its ability to perpetuate violence and abuse against women and 
children by not rightly and justly dealing with those violations “for the sake of peace, 
reconciliation and harmony.”147 Le Rous argues that generally African communities, 
rather than experience the necessary unrest that could be caused by advocacy related 
to violence against women and children, would prefer a false harmony within the 
communities.148  Nevertheless, with all its impediments, it remains that the court should 
give due allowance to the parties family members and should not act independently of 
African family legal participation should it be available and fit to do so.149 
    
                                               
144 Pieterse (note 81 above) 367. 
145 L Blutman, ‘Conceptual confusion and methodological deficiencies. Some ways that theories on 
customary international law may fail,’ (2014) 24(2) European Journal of International Law 529- 552. 
146 OR Tambo (note 7 above). The curator ad litem in this matter had a full counselling team at her 
disposal to help her and the court to better contextualize what would be in the best interests of children 
switched at birth. The presence of the CAFU team is evidence is evidence of the fact that the court 
concerns itself deeply with the emotions of all parties concerned. 
147 E le Rous, ‘The role of African Christian churches in dealing with sexual violence against women: The 
case of the democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Liberia,’ (Phd thesis, Stellenbosch University, 
2014) 61. 
148 Ibid 61. 
149 Ibid (note 26 above) 216. 
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It is accepted that the situation of children being switched at birth could lead to 
emotional turmoil for all the parties involved. This study does not favour litigation in 
resolving matters of such a familial nature. This is due to the emphasis the court places 
on the legal rules before it and the attempt to apply them to the facts at hand. It is for 
this reason that African dispute resolution is proposed as a means of negotiating a 
settlement between the parties that encompasses their underlying needs and attitudes 
over and above the facts and the application of the rule of law. This form of adjudication 
is not uncommon amongst African societies and is most likely to yield more stable 
results than an order of the court.150 
 
4.3 Parental Co-Ordination and Parental Agreements 
 
Parenting plans also commonly referred to as parenting agreements, facilitate a 
“structured approach to parents spending time with and caring for their child. It is an 
undertaking by parents to co-parent in the best interests of the child.”151 Whilst African 
dispute resolution is not uncommon amongst African societies, the same cannot be said 
for detailing agreements made between the parties in writing. This has always been a 
known weakness of African law.152 The use of parenting agreements when engaging in 
African dispute resolution is thus important because it provides proof of what was 
agreed upon by the parties. It also prevents future misunderstandings or disputes 
emanating from what was agreed upon. These agreements will further provide for the 
mandatory referral to mediation should disputes arise as a result of the agreement.153.  
 
 
 
                                               
150 PB Mkhize, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the practice of family mediation with particular reference to 
African Customary mediation,’ (LLM thesis, University of Durban, KwaZulu Natal, 1997) 72.   
151 H Bosman- Safie & L Corrie, ‘A Practical Approach to the Children’s Act’ (2010) 53. 
152 C Rautenbach, ‘Oral Law in Litigation in South Africa: Evidential Nightmare?’ PER/PELJ 2017(20) 1. 
153 Sections 21(3)(a) and 33(2) read together with section 33(5) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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4.4 Conclusion  
 
One cannot negate the importance of using African law to resolve highly sensitive 
African disputes such as African children switched at birth. This is simply because of the 
difficulty that common law and the Children’s Act have in their ability to amalgamate the 
overwhelming importance African law places on lineage and their own fundamental 
principles which favour communalism over individuality. The use of African law in 
matters related to African children switched at birth will be helpful in the following 
respects: 
 
- It will ensure that the identity of the African man, woman and ultimately child is 
preserved. 
- In using African law inspired methods such as African dispute resolution ensures that the 
overwhelming importance African law places on lineage is catered for;  
- Furthermore, it would provide an opportunity to develop its deficiency should it be found 
to be constitutionally lacking. 
 
Children are an integral component in the African culture. This is emphasisized in the 
expression akukho ndlovu yasindwa umboko wayo which is a Zulu proverb meaning no 
burden or matter is too difficult for a parent regarding his own child. As such, allowing 
another “village” to raise one’s child is not a matter to be taken lightly. It is disappointing 
that in the unreported case of Centre for Child Law (Applicant) and Respondents 
respectively NN, NS, Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court in the District of 
Boksburg, MEC of Health in Gauteng, OR Tambo Memorial Hospital Chief Executive 
Officer and LZ (NPD) case number 32043/2014 of 17 November 2015, NN did not stick 
to her initial convictions to have her child returned to her as she instead opted to heed 
whatever decision was deemed suitable by the court. The decision taken by the court in 
this instance (not returning the children to their biological parents) did not resolve the 
maintenance issue pertaining her child. It remains unclear how she will be able to 
receive maintenance from LZ for a child now proven not to be his own. In fact, this is the 
very issue that she initially approached the court in the first instance. It is for these 
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reasons that African law proponents can argue that in disputes involving African 
individuals and their law, western interpretations of such law are not acceptable. In such 
instances, it is submitted that the development of African law must be given preference. 
It therefore seems appropriate to conclude: 
 
“With these developments, a new era, characterised by new intersections between 
customary law and human rights, has dawned on the African continent.”154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
154 C Himonga, ‘African Customary Law and Children’s Rights: Intersections and Domains in a New Era,’ 
Children’s Rights in Africa: A legal Perspective, Ashgate Publishing 2013 Chapter 5, 18. 
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